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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of 
JOSEFINA CRUZ,
Charging Party,
-and- CASE NO. U-32233
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2,
Respondent,
-and-
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Employer.
JOSEFINA CRUZ, pro se
LICHTEN & BRIGHT, P.C. (DANIEL R. BRIGHT of counsel), for Respondent
DAVID BRODSKY, DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS (JOHN WALLIN of 
counsel), for Employer
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Josefina Cruz to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1 The ALJ dismissed Cruz’s amended improper 
practice charge in which she alleged that the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2 
(UFT) violated § 209-a.2 (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
failed to respond to a letter from Cruz dated June 4, 2012 seeking a re-hearing of a 
salary grievance and the provision of requested documents related to that grievance. 
After a hearing, the ALJ adhered to her pre-hearing ruling that claims filed more than 1
1 47 PERB 4552 (2014).
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four months prior to the filing of the charge were untimely, and found, as to the timely 
portion of the charge, that the evidence did not establish that the UFT had acted in an 
arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith manner in its representation of Cruz.
EXCEPTIONS
Cruz excepts to the ALJ’s ruling on four grounds. First, she asserts that the ALJ 
erred in finding various claims set forth in the charge to be untimely, arguing that 
“[djespite a significant reversal of existing Long Beach II precedent, the [ALJ’s] decision 
applied Long Beach II and ignores the new PERB Precedent {Brown).”2 Second, Cruz 
contends that the ALJ’s decision is “prejudicial” on the basis of alleged factual errors 
and for using demeanor “as a confusing criteria to adjudicate credibility.”3 Cruz’s third 
exception is predicated on “contradictions and inconsistencies with prior rulings” by the 
ALJ in the case.4 Finally, Cruz argues in her fourth exception that the ALJ’s decision 
“misapprehended and misconstrues important facts,” providing several alleged 
instances, including that “the statute of limitations for filing a PERB improper practice 
charge is tolled until the grievance machinery is exhausted,” but the [ALJ’s] decision 
makes no reference to this policy.”5
FACTS
Cruz was employed by the Board of Education of the City School District of the
2 Exceptions, ^ 1.
3 Exceptions, ^ 2.
4 Exceptions, ^ 3.
5 Exceptions, ^ 4.
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City of New York (District) as a teacher for fourteen years. In February 2010, about 
fourteen months after the District terminated her employment, Cruz received an invoice 
from the District stating that it had overpaid her more than three thousand dollars and 
was seeking to recoup that money from her.
At Cruz’s request, the UFT filed a salary grievance on her behalf disputing the 
accuracy of the District’s calculations and the amount she allegedly owed. On May 31, 
2012, a step 2 hearing was held in that grievance, at which UFT borough representative 
Perdro Serrano, whose duties include the representation of members in salary 
recoupment grievances, appeared on Cruz’s behalf. Cruz testified that, when the 
hearing ended that day, she believed that the hearing had been adjourned and had not 
been concluded.
Subsequently, Cruz wrote a letter dated June 4, 2012, addressed to Lawrence 
Becker, the District’s acting Chief Executive Officer of the Division of Human 
Resources.6 Underneath Becker’s name and address, Cruz wrote the word "via” on a 
separate line, followed by "Ellen Gallin-Procida, Director, UFT Grievance Department.”7 
The letter opens "Dear Mr. Becker,” and makes no further mention of Gallin-Procida.8
The June 4 letter contains Cruz’s account of the step 2 hearing, and Cruz’s 
objections to the conduct of the hearing, including a claim that the step 2 hearing officer 
was biased against her. In the letter, Cruz requested the District to schedule a new step 678
6 Charging Party’s Exhibit 1.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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2 hearing before a different hearing officer and that it provide her with specific 
documents.
Cruz testified that she mailed copies of her June 4, 2012 letter to both Becker 
and Gallin-Procida and that she also hand delivered a copy to the UFT office. Cruz 
further testified that she sent the letter to Gallin-Procida so that the UFT would take 
action with respect to that letter. When asked during cross-examination what she 
meant by the word "via” in the letter, Cruz initially testified that she sent the letter to the 
UFT so that they would know about the issues she addressed in that letter. She then 
testified that it was her way of asking the UFT to assist her, that the word means 
"through” and that she was indicating that Gallin-Procida was the person through whom 
she would seek action. She also testified that she thought that the UFT should know 
what to do with respect to her grievance.
On June 13, 2012, Cruz sent an e-mail to Gallin-Procida and attached a copy of 
her June 4, 2012 letter. In that e-mail, Cruz states that she has attached her June 4, 
2012 letter for her "information and action.”9
The ALJ found that Cruz sent a copy of her June 4, 2012 letter to Gallin-Procida 
and that Gallin-Procida received it, but that the letter did not clearly request that Gallin- 
Procida, or the UFT, respond or take action on Cruz’s behalf. In particular, the ALJ 
credited Gallin-Procida’s testimony that she read Cruz’s June 4, 2012 as a request to 
the District to take action, and not a request directed at the UFT. The ALJ specifically 
cited Gallin-Procida’s demeanor and the language of the letter as grounds for finding
9 See ALJ Exhibit 9, Exhibit J.
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her testimony credible. In particular, the ALJ found that:
the language of Cruz’ June 4, 2012 letter is unclear with respect to 
whether she is asking the UFT to respond or take action. The letter’s 
vagueness is demonstrated by the fact that the greeting is directed 
only towards Becker and that, in the body of the letter, Cruz does not 
specifically state that she is asking the UFT to represent her or take 
any action. Instead, the letter’s contents are directed towards the 
District and discuss Cruz’ request that the District schedule her 
grievance for another step 2 hearing before a different hearing officer 
and other related relief.10 1
The ALJ also cited the lack of any evidence of personal animosity between 
Gallin-Procida and Cruz, noting that Gallin-Procida "went out of her way to assist Cruz 
by having Cruz’s case taken out of order and an investigation and review completed 
faster than it otherwise would have.”11
The ALJ noted that the Grievance Department is not involved in scheduling, or 
representing grievants in, step 2 hearings. Additionally, Gallin-Procida understood that, 
if Cruz had a question with respect to the step 2 hearing she could ask Serrano, who 
represented her at that step, or another UFT borough representative.
The step 2 hearing officer issued her decision on June 6, 2012, in which she 
denied the grievance.12 The UFT received a copy of that decision on or about June 28, 
2012. Cruz testified that she never received a copy of the step 2 decision from the 
District and that she first received a copy of it on or about October 24, 2012, when she 
went to the UFT office. Cruz further testified that she went to the UFT office that day to
10 47 PERB H 4552, at 4704-4705.
11 Id. at 4705.
12 Charging Party Exhibit 5.
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drop off a letter dated October 24, 2012 addressed to Gallin-Procida, that she spoke 
with Serrano and gave him a copy of her October 24, 2012 letter and that Serrano 
stamped that letter in for her and gave her a copy of the step 2 decision. She testified 
that she did not know that the grievance had been denied until Serrano gave her a copy 
of the step 2 decision. According to Cruz, in her October 24, 2012 letter she inquired 
regarding her June 4, 2012 letter.
Cruz testified that she heard nothing from the UFT until November 10, 2012, 
when she received a letter from Gallin-Procida dated October 25, 2012. That letter 
states that the UFT Grievance Department had concluded its review and investigation of 
Cruz’s salary grievance and that it had concluded that her grievance could not be 
successfully pursued to arbitration.13
The amended charge does not address the claim that the UFT failed to respond 
to Cruz’s October 24, 2012 letter. The ALJ therefore found that the matter was not 
properly before her.14 In any event, she credited Gallin-Procida’s testimony that she 
had not received that letter, and Serrano’s testimony that Cruz had described the copy 
she gave him as a "carbon copy” and he thus assumed no action was expected of him.
DISCUSSION
Cruz’s reliance on decisions of the California Public Employment Relations Board 
respecting timeliness and tolling of the statute of limitations is unpersuasive, as those 
decisions are decided under another state’s statutory provisions and rules, which are
13 Charging Party’s Exhibit 4.
14 47 PERB 4552, at 4705 (citing County of Rockland and Rockland County Sheriff, 31 
PERB 3062 (1998)).
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separate and distinct from those applicable to this proceeding.15 While we might 
consider out-of-state authority to be persuasive authority in the absence of any 
applicable statutory provisions, rules, or decisions from this Board or the courts of New 
York State, no such gap exists here.
Under § 204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), "the four-month time 
period for filing a charge commences when a charging party had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the act or acts that form the basis for the charge or the date that such 
conduct could have reasonably been discovered.” 16 We "strictly apply the timeliness 
requirement, and it is not tolled by the pendency of a grievance or other related 
matters.”17 The ALJ correctly found that the UFT and the City School District of the City 
of New York raised the issue of timeliness in their answers, and therefore no waiver
15 Cruz cites Los Angeles Unified Sch Dist (Brown), PERB Dec. No. 2359 (Calif. PERB 
2014) as overruling Long Beach Cmty College Dist, PERB Dec. No. 2002 (Calif. PERB 
2009), as well as Sacramento City Unified School Dist, PERB Decision No. 1461 (Calif. 
PERB 2001).
16 Local 456, IBT (Rojas), 45 PERB ^ 3031, at 3072 (2012) (citing Solvay Union Free 
Sch Dist, 45 PERB ^ 3023 (2012); Nanuet Union Free Sch Dist, 45 PERB ^ 3007 
(2012); New York State Thruway Auth, 40 PERB ^ 3014 (2007); City of Binghamton, 31 
PERB ^ 3088 (1998); City of Oswego, 23 PERB ^ 3007 (1990); State of New York 
(GOER), 22 PERB ^ 3009 (1989); Bd of Edu of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York 
(Chamberlin), 15 PERB ^ 3050 (1982)).
17 Local 456, IBT (Rojas), supra note 16, at 3072, citing State of New York (Insurance 
Department Liquidation Bureau) (Smulyan), 45 PERB 3008 (2012); TWU (Edwards), 45 
PERB TC3014 (2012); see also State of New York (SUNY Stony Brook), 44 PERB ^
3021, at 3074 (2011), confd sub nom. Cooper v State of New York State University of 
NY at Stony Brook, 45 PERB ^ 7002 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2011).
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could be found.18
Similarly, we find no merit in Cruz’s exceptions on the ground that certain of the
ALJ’s findings in her post-hearing decision vary from her recitation of the facts
underlying the charge in her letter decision of August 16, 2013.19 These exceptions do
not take into account the differing standards applicable to a pre-hearing motion to
dismiss and to a determination after a hearing. We have long held that:
A "pre-hearing motion to dismiss for failure to set forth a prima facie 
case is properly granted only if the facts alleged cannot, as a matter 
of law, constitute a violation of the Act under any recognized or 
acceptable legal theory. In deciding such a motion, the charging 
party is entitled to all reasonable inferences and a presumption of the 
truth regarding the matters asserted.20
That presumption of truth does not apply at a hearing, at which,"[t]o establish a 
breach of the duty of fair representation under the Act, a charging party ‘has the burden 
of proof to demonstrate that an employee organization’s conduct or actions are 
arbitrary, discriminatory or founded in bad faith.’”21 As a result of the different 
procedural context, the factual recitations of the allegations of the charge in a decision 
on a motion to dismiss have no bearing on the factual findings made by an ALJ based
18 Cruz’s conclusory claims of collusion and fraudulent concealment, not supported by 
any allegation of fact, do not raise any basis upon which a claim of equitable tolling 
could be predicated. See PEF(Goonewardena), 27 PERB fl 3006, at 3012-3013 (1994).
19 ALJ Exhibit 12.
20 Buffalo City Sch Dist, 24 PERB fl 3033, at 3064 (1991) (citing Rules § 204.2; State of 
New York (Office of Mental Health), 24 PERB fl 3004 (1991).
21 Munroe (UFT), 47 PERB fl 3031, slip op, at 5 (2014) (quoting Bienko (CSEA), 47 
PERB fl 3027, 3082-3083 (2014); see District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Farrey), 
41 PERB fl 3027, at 3119 (2008)).
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upon the evidence presented, and in determining the credibility of testimonial evidence.
With respect to the one timely allegation in the charge, the allegation that the 
UFT violated the duty of fair representation by failing to respond to the June 4, 2012 
letter, Cruz has failed to provide a basis for reversal.
Cruz’s exceptions to the ALJ’s credibility determinations, including her claim that
the ALJ’s reliance on demeanor in judging credibility constituted error, are
unpersuasive. As we recently explained in County of Clinton,
Credibility determinations by an ALJ are generally entitled to "great 
weight unless there is objective evidence in the record compelling a 
conclusion that the credibility finding is manifestly incorrect.” This is 
especially true where, as here, the credibility determination rests in 
part on the witness’s "demeanor.”22
Here, no objective evidence undermines the ALJ’s credibility determinations. 
Indeed, as the ALJ properly noted, the text of the June 4, 2012 letter does not, on its 
face, ask the UFT to do anything, the Grievance Department was not normally involved 
in step 2 hearings, and no evidence of ill-will or bad faith has been adduced. In these 
circumstances, the evidence supports at most a good faith error or negligence, which is
22 47 PERB fl 3026, at 3079 (2014) (quoting Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB 
fl 3005, at 3019 (2008)); citing County of Tioga, 44 PERB fl 3016, at 3062 (2011);
Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB fl3020 (2008); City of Rochester, 23 PERB fl 
3049 (1990); Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 p Er B fl 3054 (1979); Captain's Endowment 
Assn, 10 PERB fl3034 (1977); see also County of Ulster, 39 PERB fl 3013, at 3045­
3046 (citing Fashion Institute of Technology v Helsby, 44 AD2d 550, 7 PERB fl 7005, at 
7009 (1st Dept 1974)) (deference due credibility determinations based on observation of 
witness’s demeanor).
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insufficient to breach the duty of fair representation.23
Finally, we affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that the alleged failure to respond to 
Cruz’s October 24, 2012 letter was not properly before her. We have long held "that we 
will not find a violation of the Act upon an allegation which has not been pleaded, even if 
that allegation has been litigated.”24 Moreover, even were the claim properly raised, no 
objective evidence has been adduced compelling a conclusion that the ALJ’s credibility 
findings with respect to the October 24, 2012 letter were manifestly incorrect.
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Cruz’s charge and affirm the ALJ’s decision.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
DATED: January 15, 2015
Albany, New York
23 Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, 47 PERB fl 3008, 3026 (2014); see also Civ Serv 
Empl Assn, Local 1000 v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd (Diaz), 132 AD 2d 430, 432, 20 
PERB fl 7024, 7039 (3d Dept 1987), affd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB fl 
7017 (1988)).
24 County of Rockland, 31 PERB 3062, at 3136 (1998); see also County of Nassau, 29 
PERB fl 3016 (1996); Arlington Cent Sch Dist, 25 PERB fl 3001 (1992); City of Buffalo, 
15 PERB fl 3027 (1982); City of Mt. Vernon, 14 PERB fl 3037 (1981). Indeed, even 
when a motion is made to conform the pleadings to the proof, the motion "is essentially 
a request to amend the charge. Leave to amend is not available if the effect is to add a 
new substantive claim otherwise barred by PERB's four-month statute of limitations.” 
County of Monroe, 36 PERB fl 3002, at 3005 (2003) (citing Rules § 204.1(a)(1); Town of 
Brookhaven, 26 PERB fl 3066 (1993).
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
In the Matter of
BUFFALO COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS AND 
ADMINISTRATORS, AFSA, LOCAL 10,
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-33047
- and -
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO,
Respondent.
LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME CAMBRIA, LLP (RICHARD D. FURLONG of 
counsel), for Charging Party
HODGSON RUSS, LLP (KARL W. KRISTOFF of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Buffalo Council of Supervisors 
and Administrators, AFSA, Local 10 (BCSA) and cross exceptions filed by the City 
School District of the City of Buffalo (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) in an improper practice proceeding.1 The ALJ dismissed BCSA’s improper 
practice charge, which alleged that the District violated §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (b) of the 
Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when a member of the District’s Board of 
Education, Carl Paladino, sent an e-mail to BCSA unit members that, according to 
BCSA, interfered with the employees’ protected rights under § 202 of the Act and 
dominated or interfered with BCSA’s administration.
As limited by the ALJ, the record consists of the improper practice charge and 1
1 47 PERB ^4526.
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attachments, the District’s answer, a letter from the ALJ to the parties dated October 31, 
2013, BCSA’s offer of proof dated November 22, 2013, and attachments, the District’s 
response dated January 3, 2014, and attachments, and another letter from the ALJ to 
the parties dated January 7, 2014. The record for our review also includes BCSA’s 
exceptions and brief in support of its exceptions and the District’s response and cross­
exceptions.
The ALJ held that the at-issue email, while attributable to the District, "contains 
neither a threat of reprisal nor a promise of benefits.” According to the ALJ, the email 
was "simply a recitation of Paladino’s opinion of the [District’s] superintendent and 
others in the administration of the District,” and that it was "merely critical of the 
administration of the District and of BCSA and [Buffalo Teachers Federation] 
leadership.” She concluded that "[t]he expression of opinion alone, in the absence of 
either a threat or a promise is not unlawful.”
EXCEPTIONS
BCSA alleges that the ALJ erred in concluding that Paladino’s email did not 
constitute a violation of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (b) of the Act. It further alleges that the ALJ 
erred by relying only on the parties’ papers. It argues that the ALJ should have 
conducted an evidentiary hearing.
The District, while supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that the email did not violate 
the Act, cross-excepts to the ALJ’s determination that Paladino’s email is attributable to 
the District for purposes of assessing the alleged violations. BCSA filed no response to 
the District’s cross-exceptions.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the ALJ’s conclusion that the charge must
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be dismissed, but on different grounds. On the undisputed facts of this case, we agree 
with the District that Paladino’s email cannot be attributed to the District for purposes of 
assessing the alleged violations of §§ 209-a.1 (a) and (b) of the Act.
FACTS
The ALJ based her decision primarily on BCSA’s offer of proof and attachments. 
The District did not deny that the relevant email and other attachments to BCSA’s offer 
of proof were sent and received.
On September 17, 2013, Board member Carl P. Paladino sent an e-mail to
members of BCSA and the Buffalo Teachers Federation (BTF) regarding a rally
scheduled to show support for Superintendent Pamela Brown.2 As conceded by BCSA,
the rally did not concern terms and conditions of employment. The e-mail, which
excluded BCSA’s leadership from its list of recipients, stated:
On September 16, 2013, Crystal Barton, President of Buffalo 
Council of Supervisors and Administrators (BCSA), sent a 
memo to the members of BCSA, without their or their 
officers’ consent or knowledge, requesting that you attend a 
rally in support of Superintendent Pamela Brown on 
Thursday, September 18, 2013 on the steps of City Hall at 
5:30 PM.
Apparently Phil Rumore [president of the Buffalo Teachers 
Federation] has asked the same of the teachers.
The issue is simply whether or not it is in the best interests of 
the 32,000 Buffalo Public School (BPS) children to keep the 
present Superintendent and her misfit group of phony, 
incompetent and inexperienced "turn around experts,” all 
from someplace else on the planet, looking for a paycheck.
In a school district where the morale of all constituencies is 
at rock bottom and positions are filled, not by merit, but by 
who you know or by consultant and "shadow”
2 BCSA’s offer of proof, Exhibit A.
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Superintendent Mary Guinn, who the Superintendent and 
sisterhood say is only a "reorganization/leadership 
consultant,” when in fact she runs the executive cabinet with 
no apparent actual authority. Where did they get the right to 
deny a present employee of the district, who has worked his 
or her way up in the system by merit, in favor of a 
carpetbagger with no apparent "special qualities” and a 
trumped up resume with self-awarded titles who knows 
nothing about us or our problems?
Attached is my BPS, Board of Education (BOE) Agenda 
dated August 16, 2013 and supplements dated August 20,
2013 and September 9, 2013 which explain the importance 
of ridding the BPS of this growing infection immediately.
Your union leaders have decided for you that you should 
protest the effort by some members of the Board of 
Education to remove the Superintendent from her office.
That arrogance and interference in the selection of the 
person who will act as their adversary on behalf of the 
community in dealing with the unions is not only illegal but 
also evidence of past practice that has resulted in a school 
as dysfunctional as the BPS. Your leaders, as they always 
have, assume that they know best what is good for all the 
constituencies of the BPS. Their motives dramatically 
conflict with what is good for the children of the community.
Advancing weak and inexperienced incompetents, who they 
can manipulate and control, have [sic] resulted in the chaos 
and inequities presently suffered by our teachers and 
administrators. I
I ask that you not attend the rally, but instead do the right 
thing, stand tall, don’t be intimidated and E-mail me a reply 
which will be a vote to dismiss the Superintendent and her 
cronies and change the status quo, top down. Your name 
will be kept in confidence. Feel free to forward this memo to 
your fellow teachers and administrators.
The email contained a multi-page attachment consisting of various motions that 
Paladino had made to the Board of Education over the previous several months and his
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reasons for making them.3 Among the passages contained in the attachment were
bitter criticisms of the Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools, which he
characterized as a “[c]abal.” Indeed, Paladino opined:
The BOE [Board of Education] has been controlled for over a 
generation by a self-righteous majority faction of self­
absorbed, irresponsible members with a “our way or the 
highway,” mentality. They are challenged people with no 
sense of their ongoing failures, no guilt for destroying the 
lives of children and the family fabric of their community.
They have no sense of urgency. They are clearly 
“underwater” and clueless. They do not command any 
respect from any BPS constituency including employees, 
parents or the citizens of the City. They lead from behind by 
intimidation and recrimination. They hold public office only 
because of an apathetic and complacent public and “political 
osmosis,” (the art of political parasites filling any vacuum 
when the opportunity presents itself.) They hold positions 
that require a sense of good judgment which far exceeds 
their level of competency. From a distance they look 
innocent and well-intended. Up close they play the race 
card, lie, make up their own reality, connive and scheme in 
defense of their capabilities. Despite a new awareness and 
engagement manifested in a clear mandate from the 
electorate in this past election, they continue to fight the 
inevitable need for major and dynamic change.4
Virtually all of Paladino’s motions contained in the attachment to the September 
17 email sought to undo recent actions of the Board of Education. Among the motions 
was one calling for the dismissal of the Superintendent, whom he blamed, along with 
the “Education [c]abal,” for what he considered to be the District’s status as a 
“dysfunctional train wreck.”5 He threatened that if another of his motions was not 
carried, he would “commence a taxpayer’s action seeking an order that the [State
3 BCSA’s offer of proof, Exhibit B.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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Education Department] discharge the [Board of Education] and the Superintendent in 
favor of the appointment by SED of a Special Master with the expertise to lift the District 
out of its malaise.”6
One of Paladino’s criticisms contained in the attachment was about what he 
considered to be the quelling of dissent, including the following request to the 
Superintendent: "Will you issue a directive to all employees of the [D]istrict that there will 
be no intimidation or recrimination for any person in the [D]istrict speaking out and 
speaking their mind on any issue?”7
In addition to the afore-described attachment to Paladino’s September 17 email
to BCSA unit members, BCSA’s offer of proof contains two memoranda that Paladino
sent to Board of Education President Barbara Nevergold.8 In one, which BCSA alleges
was dated August 20, 2013, Paladino opined that the
cozy symbiosis of local and State Democratic politicians . . ., 
the inner city Grassroots organization and the [District’s] 
teacher and administrator unions is also a breach of the 
public trust. The Education [c]abal supported and financed 
their ill feelings toward me and their affection for certain BOE 
members in the recent election. This is a root cause of the 
[District’s] dysfunction.9
Later in the same memo, Paladino declared: "The search criteria for the present 
Superintendent was limited by reactionary and racist BOE members who demanded a 
weak, minority, female candidate from someplace else who could then be controlled by
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 BCSA’s offer of proof, Exhibits C and D.
9 BCSA’s offer of proof, Exhibit C.
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the job of turning around a chaotic and dysfunctional school system wrought with
incompetence, corruption and a collectively incapable BOE.”11 Noting that the
Superintendent has a PhD. from Harvard, Paladino concluded that her status as
Superintendent "doesn’t say much for her.”* I12 Indeed, criticizing the BOE’s recent
hirings, Paladino stated: "Reactionary racism cannot deal with serious reform of the
iconic education systems of the 20the century.”13
In response to Paladino’s September 17 email to BCSA members, Nevergold
sent an e-mail to Crystal Barton, BCSA’s president, and Paladino, with copies to all
board members and secretaries, the attorney for BCSA, the cabinet and the
superintendent.14 The subject was "Memo from Carl Paladino to Members of Local 10
BCSA and Buffalo Teachers Federation (Not sent to your president, but nothing’s
confidential).”15 Nevergold’s e-mail provided as follows:
Mr. Paladino, I believe that a value we all share as 
Americans is that each of us has the right to freely express 
our opinion. But I also agree with Patrick Moynihan who 
said "Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own 
facts.” I am concerned, as an educator, parent, grandparent 
and member of the Board, who knows that young people are 





14 BCSA’s offer of proof, Exhibit E.
complicit BOE members.”10 According to Paladino, "no other qualified minority wanted
15 Id.
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you are sending a message that invective, name-calling, 
distorted facts and general disrespect are acceptable in 
debates where two parties don’t agree. If you care about the 
children in this District, I ask that you observe some civility in 
the messages you are sending out. We know your 
position.16
Paladino responded to Nevergold’s memo by memo dated September 19, 
attached to BCSA’s offer of proof.17 In it, Paladino harshly criticized Nevergold for the 
manner in which she conducts Board of Education meetings, particularly the way she 
treats Paladino. Also, the memo, again, criticizes the Superintendent’s hiring practices, 
stating: "You have allowed the Superintendent to hire many outsiders, exacerbating the 
morale problem. These appointees have not risen by merit through the system and 
know nothing about the District except who their godmothers are.”18 He accused 
Nevergold of sanctioning the Superintendent’s "repeated lies” regarding student 
attendance records. He criticized Nevergold for her role in hiring the District’s General 
Counsel, whom he described as having "highly questionable competence,” and he 
threatened that if Nevergold did not resign as president of the Board of Education he 
would "ask the Commissioner of Education to dismiss [her].”19 And, he renewed his 
request that the Board of Education dismiss the Superintendent. Finally, the memo 
contains a harsh criticism of Governor Andrew Cuomo’s educational policies.
As with the September 17, 2013 email that Paladino sent to BCSA members, the 
attachment and the two memoranda of August 20 and September 19 contain a *178
1 6 Id.
17 BCSA’S offer of proof, Exhibit D.
18 Id.
19 Id.
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smattering of criticisms of BCSA and its leadership. Those criticisms are primarily 
directed to what Paladino considered to be the union’s influence over decisions made 
by the Board of Education, allegedly obtained through electoral support and 
intimidation. While harsh, those criticisms pale in comparison to Paladino’s tirade 
against the District’s Board and Superintendent.
DISCUSSION
As a threshold matter, we find no fault with the ALJ’s decision not to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing. Section 205.5 (i) of the Act states that PERB is authorized "[t]o 
hold such hearings and make such inquiries as it deems necessary for it properly to 
carry out its functions and powers” (emphasis added). Section 212.4 (a) of PERB’s 
Rules of Procedure similarly states: "A formal hearing for the purpose of taking 
evidence relevant to the proceeding before the agency shall be conducted as necessary 
by the administrative law judge designated by the director” (emphasis added). Thus, 
although "[i]t shall be the duty of the [ALJ] to inquire fully into all matters at issue and to 
obtain a full and complete record” (Rules, § 212.4), a hearing is not required absent 
disputed relevant facts.20 Here, the only issue raised by BCSA was the content of 
Paladino’s email and attachments and their effect on BCSA’s and the employees’ 
protected rights. To the extent that content required any clarification, BCSA filed with its 
offer of proof additional memoranda from Paladino to Nevergold. Again, it was the 
content of those documents that BCSA relied on. Because the District did not deny that 
those documents were sent and received, there are no relevant disputed facts that 
would require an evidentiary hearing. 20
20 See, e.g., Village of Spring Valley Policemen's Benevolent Association, 14 PERB ^ 
3010 (1981).
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Relying on the same documents relied on by BCSA, the District argues that there 
is no basis to attribute Paladino’s remarks to the District or the Board of Education. 
Applying an agency analysis, the District argues, in effect, that no statements made by 
Paladino as a member of the Board of Education can violate the Act unless they are 
authorized by the Board of Education.21 The ALJ rejected that argument, stating: 
"Paladino was, however, acting as a member of the board, and as such his remarks in 
his e-mail of September 17, 2013, can be attributed to the District.”
We disagree with the ALJ’s conclusion that it was enough that Paladino was 
acting as a member of the Board of Education to attribute the alleged violations of the 
Act to the District. However, we are also not persuaded by the District’s unduly narrow 
application of agency principals to disclaim responsibility for the statements. While we 
find that there must be some agency relationship between an individual board member 
and a board of education to impute the member’s statement to the Board, the 
authorization need not be explicit, as the District seems to argue. For example, a board 
member may act with apparent or implied authority without express authorization of the 
full board of education. Thus, a board of education may violate the Act when a single 
member, although not expressly authorized by the board, credibly threatens to do 
everything in her power to terminate employees who exercise protected rights under the 
Act, if the board fails to issue a prompt, equally credible, repudiation of such threats. 
However, we need not address that issue here. The ALJ correctly observed: "Clearly, 
Paladino was not acting on behalf of the board, as his position regarding the
21 See, e.g., Appeal of Balen 40 Ed Dept Rep 479, Dec No 14,532 (January 20, 2001); 
Appeal of Silano 33 Ed Dept Rep 20, Dec No 12,961 (July 22, 1993).
Case No. U-33047 - 11 -
superintendent is well publicized and not the majority view.” On the facts of this case, 
however, we find that Paladino’s remarks cannot be attributed to the District or the 
Board of Education.
Given the language and tone of Paladino’s invectives, we conclude that no 
reasonable person could interpret them to represent the views of the District or its Board 
of Education, much less that they were apparently or implicitly made on their behalf. In 
that regard, we note that while Nevergold’s email does not expressly reject Paladino’s 
sentiments toward BCSA, it is a civil rejection of the positions that he expressed 
generally. And we find that it is a sufficient denunciation of Paladino’s positions to 
defeat any remnant claim that Paladino was acting on behalf of the District or the Board 
of Education.
Finding that Paladino’s tirade cannot be attributed to the District for purposes of 
the alleged violations, we do not need to address the ALJ’s conclusion that Paladino’s 
September 17, 2013 email did not interfere with protected rights.
Accordingly, the decision of the ALJ is affirmed, BCSA’s exceptions are denied 
and the District’s cross-exception is granted for the reasons stated herein.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
DATED: January 15, 2015
Albany, New York
STATE OF NEW YORK
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Sheldon Lamar Hunt to a decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director).1 The 
Director dismissed Hunt’s improper practice charge in which he alleged that the United 
Federation of Teachers (UFT) violated § 209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees’ Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it "conspired with [his] former employer to terminate his 
employment under false pretense.”1 2 The Director held that Hunt’s charge was untimely 
under § 204.1 of PERB’s Rules of Procedure (Rules) because it was filed more than 
four months after Hunt knew or reasonably should have known of the conduct alleged to 
have violated the Act.
EXCEPTIONS
Hunt contends that the proceedings pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a
1 47 PERB H 4577 (2014).
2 Id. at 4784 (editing marks in original).
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usurped the jurisdiction of the criminal courts, and that only after the adjudication of the 
claims against him under criminal law can the disciplinary arbitration under § 3020-a 
take place. Hunt further asserts that the UFT "has continuously engaged in an improper 
practice by not moving this instant case into the New York State” criminal courts, and 
that therefore the statute of limitations should be tolled.3
DISCUSSION
Hunt’s exceptions to the Director’s August 5, 2014 decision were dated August 
19, 2014, and were filed timely on August 20, 2014. However, these August exceptions 
lacked proof of service. When this deficiency was called to Hunt’s attention, he did not 
provide proof of service of the August exceptions, but instead filed new exceptions, 
dated October 6, 2014, with proof of service bearing that date.
Section 213.2 (a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) provides that exceptions 
must be filed "within 15 working days after receipt of a decision, report, order, ruling, or 
other appealable findings[,] or conclusions.” Likewise, pursuant to § 213.2 (a) of the 
Rules, "[t]imely service of exceptions upon all other parties is a necessary component 
for the filing of exceptions under the Rules, and this timeliness requirement is strictly 
applied.”4 Fifteen working days after August 5, (adding five calendar days for service of 
the Director’s decision by mail) elapsed on September 2, 2014. Thus, Hunt’s August 
exceptions were not, on the record before us, served, and are therefore a nullity, while
3 Exceptions, at 3.
4 State of New York (Commission of Correction), 47 PERB fl 3019, at 3058 (2014) 
(citing UFT (Pinkard), 44 PERB fl 3011, at 3042 (2011); UFT, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Elgalad), 43 PERB fl 3028 (2010); see generally Honeoye Falls-Lima Cent. Sch Dist 
(Malcolm), 41 PERB fl 3015 (2008); Town/City of Poughkeepsie Water Treatment 
Facility, 35 PERB fl 3037 (2002); Yonkers Fedn of Teachers (Jackson), 36 PERB fl 
3050 (2003)).
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his October exceptions are untimely, and both must be denied.
Even if the exceptions had been timely served and filed, however, we would 
affirm the Director’s decision. Under §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules, "the four-month time 
period for filing a charge commences when a charging party had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the act or acts that form the basis for the charge or the date that such 
conduct could have reasonably been discovered.” 5 We "strictly apply the timeliness 
requirement, and it is not tolled by the pendency of a grievance or other related 
matters.”6
According to the amended improper practice charge, Hunt was terminated by the 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York (DOE) on August 
19, 2010, having been found guilty of charges of misconduct filed under § 3020-a of the 
Education Law. Hunt admits that the charges against him were brought on October 15, 
2008, and that his employment was terminated on August 19, 2010. Moreover, the UFT 
ceased providing representation for Hunt in May 2010. The UFT’s representation of 
Hunt, up to and including the withdrawal of the UFT’s provided counsel on May 5, 2010, 
was the subject of a prior improper practice proceeding, in which we found no breach of 
the duty of fair representation on the part of the UFT.7 567
5 Local 456, IBT (Rojas), 45 PERB fl 3031, at 3072 (2012) (citing Solvay Union Free 
Sch Dist, 45 PERB fl 3023 (2012); Nanuet Union Free Sch Dist, 45 PERB fl3007 
(2012); New York State Thruway Auth, 40 PERB fl 3014 (2007); City of Binghamton, 31 
PERB fl 3088 (1998); City of Oswego, 23 PERB fl 3007 (1990); State of New York 
(GOER), 22 PERB fl 3009 (1989); Bd of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City of New 
York (Chamberlin), 15 PERB fl 3050 (1982)).
6 Id.
7 UFT (Hunt), 45 PERB fl 3039 (2012) (affg, 45 PERB fl^  4502 (2012)). The facts 
regarding the UFT’s representation of Hunt and its termination, are found in our prior 
opinion and that of the Administrative Law Judge which we affirmed.
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The original charge in this matter was filed on May 27, 2014, almost four years 
after the UFT withdrew from representing Hunt, and almost four years after the last 
alleged act, his termination. No act or omission within four months of the filing of the 
charge has been alleged, nor any lack of knowledge of the acts outside of the limitations 
period. Therefore, Hunt’s claims are untimely.
Moreover, even if both the exceptions and the underlying charge were not 
independently time-barred, the Director properly found that the conclusory allegation of 
collusion without any factual predicate did not suffice to state a claim.8
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Hunt’s charge and affirm the decision of the 
Director.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is,
dismissed in its entirety.
DATED: January 15, 2015
Albany, New York
8 See, e.g, PEF (Goonewardena), 27 PERB 3006 (1994). We note that, in addition, 
the res judicata effect of our prior decision concerning the UFT’s representation of Hunt 
provides yet another basis for dismissal of this charge. See, e.g., UFT (Grassel), 43 
PERB 3033, at 3127, n. 6 (2010).
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER
This case comes to us on a motion pursuant to §§ 213.2 (b) and 212.4 (h) of our 
Rules of Procedure (Rules) for leave to file exceptions to the Board challenging a pre­
hearing ruling of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director), conditionally dismissing the above-captioned proceeding. For the reasons 
given in our recent decision in New Visions Charter High School for the Humanities,1 we 
grant the motions, deny the exceptions, and affirm the conditional dismissal of this 
matter, with leave to re-open the case upon further administrative or judicial decisions 
resolving the issue of our jurisdiction over the employer at issue.
As we explained in New Visions:
On May 28, 2014, a regional director of the NLRB found that a 
charter school created pursuant to the Charter Schools Act was "not
1 47 PERB 3023 (2014).
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exempt as a ‘political subdivision’ within the meaning of” the NLRA, 
and that "the NLRB has jurisdiction over the Employer in this case.”2 
In so ruling, the Regional Director opined that "[t]he Board would find 
it ‘not controlling’ at best and ‘immaterial’ at worst, that the New York 
legislature intended charter schools to be public schools in many 
respects, including specifically being subject to the state's Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act.”3 On August 6, 2014, the NLRB 
granted review of the Regional Director’s decision.
However, as we noted in Brooklyn Excelsior Charter School, and 
consistent with the Appellate Division’s finding in Buffalo United 
Charter School, the "NLRB and the federal courts have ultimate 
authority over issues of preemption.”4
As of the present writing, the NLRB has not yet decided the issue in Hyde
Leadership Charter School-Brooklyn. Accordingly, "[a]s the NLRB is in the process of
exercising its primary jurisdiction to determine the question of preemption, we find that
the [Director and ALJs] did not err in conditionally dismissing the instant petition subject
to the outcome of such determination.”5
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the above-captioned proceeding must be,
and hereby is, conditionally dismissed, with leave to re-open the case upon further
administrative or judicial decisions resolving the issue of our jurisdiction over the
2 Hyde Leadership Charter School-Brooklyn, 47 PERB fl 8001, at 8010 (2014).
3 Id. at 8009 (quoting Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy Charter School, Inc., 
359 NLRB No. 41 (2012); The Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School (Case 06-RC- 
120811,2014 WL 1390806 (April 9, 2014)(unpublished opinion denying review)).
4 New Visions, supra note 1, at 3067 (citing Brooklyn Excelsior Charter School, 44 
PERB fl 3001, at 3019 (2011) (subsequent history omitted), and Buffalo United Charter 
School v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 107 AD3d 1437, 1437-1438, 46 PERB fl 7009 




DATED: January 15, 2015
Albany, New York
